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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
"Primarily for Sale" in I.R.C. Sections 1221 and 
1231 Held To Mean "Principally for Sale" 
Rather than "Substantially for Sale"-
Malat v. Riddell* 
Sections 1221 and 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code disqualify 
from capital gains treatment profits derived from the sale or exchange 
of property "held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in 
the ordinary course of his trade or business."1 In deciding whether 
these sections deny capital gains treatment to profits realized by 
real estate dealers from the sale or exchange of land,2 the circuit 
courts, while examining similar facts in relation to the same criteria,3 
have reached divergent conclusions.4 Two recent decisions, Municipal 
Bond Corp. v. Commissioner> and Malat v. Riddell,6 illustrate these 
• 383 U.S. 569 (1966). 
I. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221 states in pertinent part: 
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held by the 
taxpayer •.• , but does not include-
(!) ••• property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the 
ordinary course of his trade or business • • • • 
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231 provides generally that gains realized on the sale 
of "property used in the trade or business" may be treated as capital gains in some 
instances. Section 1231(b) defines "property used in the trade or business" as: 
(I) ••• property used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject 
to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, held for more than 
six months, and real property used in the trade or business, held for more 
than six months, which is not- ••• 
{B) property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the 
ordinary course of his trade or business •••• 
2. While this note analyzes capital gains treatment for dealers ,vho sell or exchange 
the property in which they customarily deal in the context of real estate dealers who 
sell land, the same problems arise with dealers of other property. The same criteria 
must be used for all dealers. See note 23 infra. 
3. These criteria, first enumerated in Boomhower v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 
997, 1002 (N.D. Iowa 1947), are: continuity of sales or related activity over a period 
of time; frequency of sales, as opposed to isolated transactions; business or activity 
of seller and his agents; effort put forth in sales (improvements or sales campaigns); 
the extent and substantiality of transactions; the reasons and purposes for, or nature 
of, the acquisition of the asset. These criteria have been applied in Mathews v. Com• 
missioner, 315 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1963); Tidwell v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 864 (4th 
Cir. 1962); Yunker v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 130 (6th Cir. 1958); Curtis Co, v. Com• 
missioner, 232 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1956); Chandler v. United States, 226 F.2d 403 (7th 
Cir. 1955); Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1954); McGah v. 
Commissioner, 210 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1954). 
4. Compare Carlson v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1961), and Dillon v, 
Commissioner, 213 F.2d 218 (8th Cir. 1954), with Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 
190 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1951), and S.E.C. Corp. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 717 
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), affd per curiam, 241 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 909 
(1957). 
5. 341 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1965). The Solicitor General chose not to file a petition 
for certiorari. See P-H 1965 FED. TAX. SERv. ,r 56404 (June 3, 1965). 
6. 347 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1965). 
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discordant results. In Municipal Bond the Eighth Circuit ruled that 
a real estate dealer holds land "primarily for sale" only if his principal 
intention in holding the property is to sell it for gain. In contrast, 
the Ninth Circuit in Malat held that a real estate dealer holds land 
"primarily for sale" if, when he originally purchases the property 
he has as part of his overall plan, a substantial intention to sell the 
property for gain. In an attempt to resolve this controversy the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Malat,7 and in a 
per curiam opinion determined that "primarily for sale" means 
"principally for sale" rather than "substantially for sale."8 
In spite of a preponderance of authority to the contrary in the 
lower federal courts,9 the Supreme Court's preference for a dictionary 
definition appears sound. It is a well established rule of statutory 
construction that words should be interpreted in their ordinary, 
everyday meaning.1° Furthermore, the Supreme Court's reading of 
the statutory language is consistent with one of the primary purposes 
of the capital gains provisions-the stimulation of investment.11 To 
the extent that real estate dealers hold land for purposes other than 
sale in the ordinary course of trade or business, they should be 
entitled to capital gains treatment just as is any other investor.12 
Capital gains treatment is even more justifiable for investors who 
are not real estate dealers in the sense that real estate sales constitute 
their major vocation, but are nevertheless classified as dealers for 
7. 382 U.S. 900 (1965). 
8, 383 U.S. 569 (1966). 
9. Ametican Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 
375 U.S. 993 (1964); Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951); 
S.E.C. Corp. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), affd per curiam, 241 F.2d 
416 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 909 (1957); Desilu Productions Inc., P-H TAX Or. 
REP. &: MEl\f. DEC. 1 65307 (1965). 
IO. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I, 6 (1947). See also Hanover Bank v. Com-
misisoner, 369 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1962); Commissioner v. Korell, 339 U.S. 619, 627-28 
(1950). 
11. It has been said that the capital gains provisions not only facilitate economic 
gi.owth by encouraging investment (Presidential Message on Tax Reduction and Re-
form, 109 CoNG. REc. 962 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1963); see generally BUTrERS, THOMPSON &: 
BOLi.INGER, EFFEC'IS OF TAXATION: INVESTMENTS BY INDMDUAIS (1953)), but also increase 
the mobility of investment funds. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1942). 
12. The importance of the taxpayBr's being a dealer arises from the code provisions 
denying capital gains treatment to profits from the sale of property held primarily for 
sale to customers "in the ordinary course of his trade or business." See INT. REv. CODE 
OF 1954, §§ 123l(a), (b)(l)(B). To be in the real estate "business" for purposes of these 
provisions, however, the taxpayer need not be a broker or sell real estate as an occupa-
tion. It is sufficient that he carry on a significant number of sales activities. Thus, an 
investor who buys land and later carries on an extensive sales program may qualify as 
being in the real estate business. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 
1964), affirming 40 T.C. 1067 (1963); Gault v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 
1964); Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1963); Mathews v. Commis-
sioner, 315 F.2d 101 (6th Cir.), rehearing denied, 317 F.2d !!60 (1963); Frankenstein v. 
Commissioner, 272 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1959); Bistline v. United States, 260 F.2d 80 
(9th Cir. 1958); Marx v. United States, CCH U.S.T.C. 1f 9369 (S.D. Cal., Dec. 3, 1965). 
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the purposes of sections 1221 and 1231.13 While the impact on these 
investors who occasionally deal in real estate has been mitigated to 
some degree by section 1237, the limitations of this section prohibit 
its broad application.14 
However salutary the result, the Supreme Court's abbreviated 
analysis in its per curiam opinion is subject to criticism. Initially, the 
Court gave little consideration to the key question whether a sale 
of land held, as the district court found, by a real estate dealer for 
sale or rent, whichever becomes more profitable, is an integral part 
of a real estate dealer's business and thus subject to ordinary income 
treat:J;nent.15 This question would seem to merit some consideration, 
since it is a question by which the courts of appeals have been 
troubled.16 The Court could have been of more assistance to the 
lower courts by bolstering its opinion with an analysis of congres-
sional intent. There are indications in the legislative history of the 
pertinent revenue acts that Congress intended that the sale of land 
held by a real estate dealer for sale or rent, whichever becomes more 
profitable, be treated as part of his ordinary business. Attempts were 
made to draft a section for the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 
permitting real estate dealers to obtain capital gains treatment on 
profits from personal investments in land if the property was properly 
earmarked.17 The House recommended a bill with a provision 
allowing a limited access to capital gains treatment by real estate 
dealers on profits from the sale of land,18 but the provision was 
13. See note 12 supra. 
14. Section 1237 allows capital gains tr~atment of profits from the sale of subdivided 
real estate provided that a number of conditions are met. Among the conditions arc 
(1) the property must not have been previously held primarily for sale; (2) no sub• 
stantial improvement can have been made; (3) the taxpayer cannot hold any other 
real property primarily for sale during the year the sale is made; and (4) no more 
than five lots can have been sold that year. 
15. Rather, the Court merely said: "The purpose of the statutory provision with 
which we deal is to differentiate between the 'profits and losses arising from the 
everyday operation of a business' on the one hand, and 'the realization of appreciation 
over a substantial period of time' on the other." The Court evidently regards the two 
categories as mutually exclusive, a conclusion which seems fallacious in light of Com 
Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). In that case the taxpayer 
had bought and sold grain futures. Even though the gain had appreciated over a 
substantial period of time, capital gains treatment was disallowed because the dealings 
were deemed to have constituted an integral part of the taxpayer's business. The 
Court's cursory treatment of this issue may not only confound lower courts, but may 
also enable them to circumvent the actual holding of the case. See note 26 infra. 
16. See Malat v. Riddell, 347 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1965); Municipal :Bond Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 341 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1965); Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 
190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951); cf. American Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604 
(2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1964); Gotfredson v. United States, 303 F.2d 
464 (6th Cir. 1962). · 
17. Hearings on Internal Revenue Code of 1954 Before the House Committee on 
Ways and Means, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1013-14, 1164-67 (1953). 
18. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1237 (1954). The proposed bill was similar 
to § 1236, which allows capital gains treatment to securities dealers who properly ear-
mark the securities they trade for their own accounts. 
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deleted by the Senate, in part because of a fear that loopholes in the 
bill would allow capital gains treatment for sums which should be 
classified as ordinary income.19 The same congressional intent was 
manifested by the inclusion of certain limitations on real estate 
trusts for the specific purpose of precluding real estate dealers who 
buy and sell land for gain from obtaining capital gains treatment on 
the resulting profits.20 
A second basic criticism of the Supreme Court's analysis stems 
from the fact that the Court, in relying on the rule of statutory 
construction that words should be interpreted in their ordinary, 
everyday sense, did not discuss its refusal in the past to adhere to the 
rule in interpreting the definition of a capital asset. Although the 
term "capital asset" is broadly defined in the Code,21 the Court has 
consistently stated that the definition is to be restrictively inter-
preted.22 This traditional departure from a literal interpretation 
seems more drastic than the departure by courts which adopted the 
"substantially for sale" test, for while there is a striking semantic 
difference between "substantially" and "principally" or "primarily," 
the practical difference in the interpretation of sections 1221 and 
1231 seems minimal. The courts which adopted the "substantially 
for sale" test generally did so to deny capital gains treatment where 
the intent to sell was equal to the intent to rent.28 That test, there-
19. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. ll4 (1954). 
20. Hearings on Internal Revenue Code of 1951 Before the Senate Finance Com• 
mittee, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1275 (1954). 
21, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221. 
22, Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955); Kieselbach v. 
Commissioner, 317 U.S. 399, 403 (1943); Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 31 (1941); 
Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 108 (1931). 
23, See, e.g., American Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. 
denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1964). The "substantially for sale" test was used to deny capital 
gains treatment where there was a specific finding that the assets had been held with 
an equal intent to sell or to rent. 
In Malat, the district court denied capital gains treatment after finding that the 
intent to sell was equal to the intent to rent. The Ninth Circuit in affirming relied 
on its prior decision in Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 
1951), in which capital gains treatment was disallowed to a real estate dealer who 
intended to sell or rent, whichever became more profitable. In reaching its conclusion, 
however, the Ninth Circuit gave two hypothetical situations to illustrate what pur-
poses do and do not constitute a primary intention to sell: 
(1) If the purpose for which the property was acquired and held was solely 
and specifically to develop for rental; if it excluded the realization of gain other 
than in that fashion; and if such purpose was accompanied by an intent to liqui-
date (irrespective of consequent gain or loss) if this purpose failed, then a sale 
pursuant to such a program might well be regarded as nothing more than liqui-
dation of a disappointing investment. 
(2) If, however, the property was acquired and held with the purpose of real-
izing gain from it in any feasible manner which might present itself; if the owner 
stood ready to adapt his program to such changes as failing prospects might re-
quire and to realize gain wherever and however he could; then surely the realiza-
tion of gain by sale is pursuant to the purpose of the holding. The taxpayer in 
such a case could be said throughout the course of his holding to have had several 
alternative purposes (all of which were substantial reasons for his holding within 
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fore, must be taken as meaning that capital gains treatment would 
be denied to gains from the sale of an asset held with an intent to sell 
which is substantially equal to the intent to rent. Thus, the only 
case where the result reached using the "principally for sale" test 
would differ from the result reached using the "substantially for 
sale" test is that in which an asset is held equally for rent or sale: 
where there is equality of intent, capital gains treatment must be 
allowed under the "principally for sale" test, since the asset cannot 
be said to be held "principally" for either purpose.2~ 
the Rollingwood definition of "primary'), each of which in turn actually became 
the primary purpose as efforts were concentrated in its direction. 
If considered as general criteria for establishing the eligibility for capital gains treat-
ment of profits from the sale of land by real estate dealers, these hypotheticals bristle 
with difficulty. The language appears to exclude from capital gains treatment profits 
realized on the sale of property by a real estate dealer who has any intent to sell for 
gain, even though that intent is clearly subordinate to his dominant intent to rent. 
However, it seems clear that the Ninth Circuit did not intend these hypotheticals 
to establish general criteria. Language preceding the hypotheticals indicates that the 
court intended them to apply only where an investment program had been frustrated 
at the outset. This interpretation is substantiated by the opinion in a contemporaneous 
Ninth Circuit case. In Margolis v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1964), the 
taxpayer had acquired and subdivided a number of pieces of property, retaining 
some land from each subdivision for commercial purposes. Thereafter the taxpayer 
made several exchanges of this property over a period of more than two years. The 
gains from these exchanges were treated as capital gains, even though the intent to 
exchange the property near the end of the two years was clearly greater than the 
minimum which would be required by the hypotheticals. 
24. The practical insignificance of the test used can be seen not only in real estate 
cases, but also in a number of other areas. 
Machinery. In Philber Equip. Corp. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1956), 
the court held that since the dominant intention of the company was the leasing of 
equipment, the intent to sell the equipment when it could no longer be leased was 
subordinate, and that profits from the sale could thus qualify for capital gains treat• 
ment. The result reached would be the same no matter which of the tests is used, In 
American Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 
993 (1964), the court employed the "substantially for sale" test with respect to 
machinery held with equal intent to sell or to rent. Had the court used the "princi• 
pally for sale" test, capital gains treatment would have been denied. In S.E.C. Corp. v. 
United States, 140 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), affd per curiam, 241 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 909 (1957), the court used the "substantial" test to deny capital 
gains treatment where the sale was an integral part of the taxpayer's business. (The 
result which would be reached under the "principally for sale" test cannot be deter-
mined from the findings of fact in this case.) 
Automobiles. In Hillard v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1960), it was held 
that a rental agency selling cars no longer useful could obtain capital gains treatment 
on the profits, since the sales were only an incident of the business; the result would 
have been the same no matter which test was used. In Greene-Haldeman v. Commis-· 
sioner, 282 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1960), the court disallowed capital gains treatment on 
profits from the sales of cars where leases contained options to buy, ,vith previous 
payments being applied against the purchase price, and evidence showed that the 
dealer leased cars only because he could obtain more cars from the manufacturer by 
doing so. It would appear that capital gains treatment would have been disallowed 
even if the "principally for sale" test had been used. See also Rev. Rul. 108, 1953-1 
CUM. BuLL. 185 (denying capital gains treatment to taxpayers who customarily buy 
automobiles at wholesale prices or fleet discounts and, after leasing them for a period 
substantially shorter than their normal useful life, sell them at wholesale or retail 
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A third criticism of the Supreme Court's per curiam opinion in 
Malat can be directed to the manner in which the Supreme Court 
instructed the district court to dispose of the case on remand. The 
district court had made a specific finding that the property was held 
with an equal intent to rent or to sell.25 Using the "principally for 
sale" test adopted by the Supreme Court, it would appear that on 
these facts the Court could have directed the district court to hqld 
for the taxpayer on remand, since the property was riot held with a 
"principal" intention to sell. However, the Supreme Court in-
structed the district court to make a new finding of fact based on the 
correct legal test. In so doing the Supreme Court has intimated that 
it would be possible in Malat £or the district court to find that the 
property was held "principally for sale." It would thus appear that 
the factual determination may vary with the test used. This apparent 
oversight on the part of the Court emphasizes the minimal distinction 
between the two tests. Under the "principally for sale" test a court 
must find as a matter of fact that the taxpayer's intent to sell was 
greater than his intent to invest before it may deny capital gains 
treatment. The difference between a finding of an · equal intent to 
invest and to sell and a finding that ,the intent to sell is infinitesimally 
greater than the intent to invest may prove to be so minute that 
courts will reach the same result no matter which test is used. 26 Never-
prices, provided that the taxpayer is in the business of dealing in automobiles as 
well as leasing them); Rev. Rul. 229, 1954-1 CUM. BuLL. 124 (excepting from the above 
ruling taxpayers who: (1) are primarily engaged in the business of renting and leasing 
motor vehicles to others, (2) sell their vehicles at wholesale prices to dealers, whole-
salers, or jobbers, and (3) do not maintain facilities for the retail sale of such vehicles). 
These rulings seem consistent with either test. 
Motion Pictures. In Desilu Productions, Inc., P-H TAX Cr. REP. & MEM. DEC. 
,r 65307 (1965), the Tax Court held that profits on the sale of motion pictures which 
had previously been rented qualified as capital gains, since the main reason for hold-
ing the films was for rental. Although the Tax Coun adopted the "substantially for 
sale" test, the same result would be reached using the "principally for sale" test. 
Livestock. In United States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1951), and Albright 
v. United States, 173 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1949), it was held that the taxpayers were 
entitled to capital gains treatment on the sale of livestock where the sale was merely 
an incident of the taxpayers' business. This result is consistent with either test. See 
also Gotfredson v. United States, 303 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1962), which rejected the 
proposition that capital gains treatment must be denied if the taxpayer holds cattle 
with an equal intent to sell or to market their milk. 
25. See Malat v. Riddell, 347 F.2d 23, 27 n.3 (9th Cir. 1965). 
26. A number of cases since Malat support this argument. On the remand of 
Municipal Bond, 46 T.G. # 19 (May 16, 1966), the Tax Coun all but emasculated the 
Supreme Court's decision in Malat. Despite a finding that the property had been held 
"with the principal objective of realizing the best profit available therefrom, whether 
it be from rental or sale, whichever seemed best at the time," it disallowed capital 
gains treatment stating: 
Petitioner is a corporation whose sole business activity over a number of years has 
apparently been buying, holding, renting and selling real estate. While we 
recognize that a corporation may be an investor in real estate and entitled to 
capital gain on the profits realized on the sale of such investment property ..• , 
we find it difficult to understand how the profits realized on the sales of property 
by a corporation engaged solely in the above business can be considered other 
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theless, the semantic difference in the tests will undoubtedly be 
sufficient to encourage real estate dealers to seek capital gains treat• 
ment in transactions where such treatment would previously have 
been precluded.27 
than the "profits • • . arising from the everyday operation" of that business, 
unless the corporation can show by convincing evidence that its primary purpose 
for acquiring all of its properties ••• [was to derive income rather than hold for 
sale]. 
Thus, with a fact finding identical to that in Malat, the Tax Court used the language 
employed by the Supreme Court in Malat to reach a result contrary to the spirit 
of the Court's mandate. 
The efficiacy of the Supreme Court's holding that "primarily" means "principally" 
was further diluted by Judge Tannewald's concurring opinion in S.C. Bynum, 46 
T.C. # 28 Gune 3, 1966). In trying to clarify the Tax Court's position he said that 
"primarily," as utilized by the Supreme Court, means of "first importance." He con• 
tinued: "The element of substantiality is no longer enough. By the same token, the 
proscribed purpose does not, I believe, have to be capable of a quantitive measurement 
of more than 50 per cent. It should be sufficient if such purpose is primus inter pares," 
He went on to emphasize the increased significance of the phrase "in the ordinary 
course of business," a point which was also emphasized in Joan E. Heller Trust, 
P-H TAX CT. REP. &: MEM. DEc. fl 66-121 Gune 6, 1966). In the latter case the Tax 
Court disallowed capital gains treatment on the profits from the sale of certain duplex 
houses with another semantic sleight of hand: 
When we say in our opinion that petitioner intended at the outset to either rent 
or sell these houses, whichever proved more profitable, we are talking of a 
taxpayer whose primary business was developing and selling houses and who was 
about to try renting some of its houses, and if renting proved unprofitable, 
then it would be abandoned as a business endeavor and the houses, like the 
other 500 houses it built and sold to customers, would be held primarily for 
sale to customers in the ordinary course of its business. 
Thus, in a situation in which property is held for rental or sale, whichever becomes 
more profitable, the court will look beyond the finding of the actual intention of 
the taxpayer to the nature of the taxpayer's business in order to circumvent the 
liberal interpretation of "primarily for sale." 
27. The decision in Malat on remand can be found in P-H 1966 FED, TAX SERV, 
(18 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5015) ,I 66-5003 (S.D. Cal. May 6, 1966) (capital gain), 
